Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals
康德主义哲学家 Christine Korsgaard 从康德伦理学内部出发，论证所有有感知力的动物都是「目的本身」——我们对动物的道德义务不是同情的延伸，而是理性的要求。 Kantian philosopher Christine Korsgaard argues from within Kantian ethics that all sentient animals are 'ends-in-themselves' — our moral obligations to animals are not extensions of sympathy but demands of reason.
Fellow Creatures (Oxford UP, 2018) is a major intervention in animal ethics from the Kantian tradition. Korsgaard challenges the common reading that Kant’s ethics excludes animals from moral consideration. She argues that as creatures who experience their own lives as mattering to them, all sentient animals are ends-in-themselves. The book reconstructs Kantian moral theory to show that our obligations to other animals arise from the same rational grounds as our obligations to fellow humans — making it one of the most significant Kantian defenses of animal rights.